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Cubans were jubilant when president Barack Obama visited the island in March, but economic 
reforms have not progressed in line with the people’s hopes of change. Ueslei Marcelino/Reuters  
 
When US President Barack Obama made his historic March 2016 visit to Havana, Cuban 
expectations of better times to come were high. As the United States goes to the polls to select its 
next president, it’s clear that rapprochement with Cuba will be a key achievement of the Obama 
administration.  
But the slow pace of reform in Cuba is raising questions about President Raúl Castro’s legacy. 
Frustration has begun to set in, with energy cuts paralysing production, the economy shrinking, 
and the country’s economic “updating process” seemingly going in reverse.  
What is derailing Cuba’s much-anticipated reform course?  
More questions than answers 
With the economy forecast to decrease by 2.9% in 2016, the country’s socialist government is 
reimposing price controls and putting brakes on the emerging small-scale private sector. 
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Is Cuba’s backtracking the fallout from Venezuela’s drastic reduction in oil shipments to the 
country, forcing it to slash imports and adopt austerity measures? Or does Havana fear losing 
control as White House policy turns from strangulation to embrace?  
Or perhaps the retrenchment is the result of the Raúl Castro government gathering strength to 
finally tackle its most complex economic problem: overcoming the highly distorting coexistence 
of two competing currencies, the dollar-linked Cuban convertible peso (CUC) and the greatly 
devalued Cuban peso (CUP)? 
The answer probably is a combination of all three according to a recent study asessing the 
prospects of Cuba’s development model, which I undertook alongside other European and Cuban 
scholars for the Third World Quarterly.  
The beginning of ‘a very long journey’ 
In Cuba, economic and political considerations go hand in hand. As Havana-based economist 
Ricardo Torres has stressed, in the ten years since Raúl Castro assumed office, the island’s 
economic structure has indeed been substantially transformed.  
What’s more, Raul’s reforms over the past eight years have not been ad hoc changes; they form 
part of a long-term strategy of gradual reform, backed by programmatic documents adopted at 
the Communist Party’s conferences.  
But unresolved contradictions in the economy have limited positive effects on growth and 
salaries. Torres concludes that it is becoming increasingly clear that Cuba’s reforms over the past 
eight years are just at the early stage of a very long journey.  
The most dramatic contradiction of the Cuban economy is the uncomfortable coexistence of two 
disparate currencies. State salaries are paid in CUP, averaging 687 pesos per month. At official 
currency exchange houses, this is less than 40 CUC, or US$40.  
Since Cubans need to buy more and more everyday items – from cooking oil to shampoo – in the 
convertible currency, the chasm with their peso salaries widens. This is not only damaging the 
economy but also tearing apart the island’s social fabric.  
Combining these two currencies will be monumentally difficult, with implications for all sectors 
of economy and society. And it has long been on Raul’s agenda.  
Some reports suggest that the often postponed monetary unification is set to occur before year’s 
end. That may necessitate slashing imports, not just to adjust to reduced Venezuelan supplies but, 
crucially, to build up reserves that could defend the currency against foreseeable inflationary 
pressures.  
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Liberalisation of Cuba’s economy has created an industry of upscale private restaurants like this 
one, but the average salary remains US$40/month. Enrique de la Osa/Reuters  
It’s not (just) the economy, stupid 
In Cuba, political factors weigh very heavily. Laurence Whitehead from Oxford University 
stresses that the puzzle of the exceptional resilience of the Cuban regime cannot be understood 
without taking into account its sources of legitimisation and discursive justifications.  
For half a century, Havana’s uncompromising stance against the US played a key role in 
bolstering support for the socialist government, even when such political isolation meant 
hardship for the Cuban people. The recent rapprochement with Washington is a diplomatic 
victory, but normalisation – and particularly the decidedly warm welcome given to Obama – 
weakens this pillar of legitimisation.  
Norwegian analyst Vegard Bye argues that Obama’s opening to Cuba may have actually 
imperilled the reform process. Fears in Havana that friendly ties with the US, combined with a 
strengthened entrepreneurial sector at home, will eventually undermine the revolutionary project 
could lead to retrenchment. 
While foreign observers usually see the emergent private sector only in tourist-targeted 
restaurants (paladares) and B&Bs (casas particulares), Yailenis Mulet from the University of 
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Havana shows a much more complex picture in her analysis of Cuba’s shoe-manufacturing 
sector.  
Based on field research, she estimates that the private sector associated with the shoe production 
chain employs over 12,000 Cubans, making it a sizeable industry in the shrunken island 
economy. But restrictive regulations, the weak legal standing of many producers in the supply 
chain, and the lack of wholesale markets for production inputs raise manifold obstacles to the 
growth of this remarkable domestic sector. 
Meanwhile, the country is importing brand-name shoes to sell in the state-run shops aimed at 
Cubans with sufficient access to hard currency.  
US President Barack Obama with Cuban president Raul Castro at a baseball game in Havana 
during his visit in March 2016. Jonathan Ernst/Reuters  
‘More participatory’ and ‘democratic’ socialism 
When Raúl Castro steps down as head of state in 2018, as he has pledged, his legacy will depend 
on both the results of the economic reforms he initiated and his agenda for political change.  
While he has forsworn transition to a multi-party democracy, he did promise to make Cuban 
socialism more participatory, the Communist Party more democratic and the media more critical.  
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And indeed, since Raúl Castro took over from his brother Fidel ten years ago, Cuba has turned 
from a model of charismatic socialism to one of bureaucratic socialism. This has meant 
depersonalising politics and strengthening the nation’s institutions.  
As I argued in my contribution to the Third World Quarterly, Raúl’s “bureaucratic socialism in 
reform mode” has changed Cuban politics in two additional ways.  
First, the liberalisation of travel and migration laws has expanded citizen rights vis-á-vis the state: 
Cubans no longer depend on an exit permit and goodwill from above to go abroad.  
Second, the de facto (if unsteady) tolerance of emerging digital media voices has led to the most 
diversified Cuban public sphere since before the 1959 revolution. The state still defends the state 
media monopoly as a constitutionally enshrined Communist pillar. But the reach of government 
publications like Granma is eroding.  
In practice Cubans – especially the young and urban – can now access all sorts of information 
via mobile phones and flash drives.  
Meanwhile, as Cuban socialism is digesting the impact of reconciliation with the US and the 
fallout from Venezuela’s economic and political crises, Raúl Castro’s broader agenda of political 
change seems paralysed.  
Quite a number of the major projects he had announced still await implementation, including 
reforming the country’s constitution, revising electoral law, and reducing the number of 
delegates in the National Assembly.  
As Obama’s tenure comes to a close, Raúl Castro has over a year left in his presidency. But the 
clock is ticking, and Raúl certainly knows he shouldn’t leave the reforms to his successors in 
Cuba’s soon-to-come post-Castro era. 
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